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Sanism and the Law
Michael L. Perlin, JD
“Sanism,” an irrational prejudice against people with mental illness, is of the same
quality and character as other irrational prejudices such as racism, sexism,
homophobia, and ethnic bigotry that cause (and are reflected in) prevailing social
attitudes [1, 2]. It infects both our jurisprudence and our lawyering practices. Sanism
is largely invisible and largely socially acceptable. It is based predominantly upon
stereotype, myth, superstition, and deindividualization and is sustained and
perpetuated by our use of alleged “ordinary common sense” (OCS) and heuristic
reasoning in irrational responses to events in both everyday life and the legal process
[3, 4].
I have written extensively about the roots of the assumptions that are made by the
legal system about persons with mental disabilities. These mistaken assumptions
include: that people with mental illness are erratic, deviant, sexually uncontrollable,
emotionally unstable, superstitious, lazy, and ignorant; that they demonstrate a
primitive morality; they are invariably more dangerous than persons without mental
illness, and such dangerousness is easily and accurately identified by experts; that for
a person in treatment for mental illness to decline to take prescribed antipsychotic
medication is an excellent predictor of (1) future dangerousness and (2) need for
involuntary institutionalization; that people with mental illness should be segregated
in large, distant institutions because their presence threatens the economic and social
stability of residential communities; that they give in too easily to their basest
instincts and do not exercise appropriate self-restraint [5].
These assumptions—which reflect societal fears and apprehensions about mental
disability, persons with mental disabilities, and the possibility that any individual
may become mentally disabled—ignore the most important question of all—why do
we feel the way we do about people with mental disabilities [6, 7]? One explanation
may lay in history. Thousands of years ago, it was commonly believed that sickness
was “a punishment sent by God” [8]. Historian Judith Neaman has concluded that
“demonic possession remains the simplest, the most dramatic, and secretly, the most
attractive of all explanations of insanity in the Middle Ages” [9, 10]. Society saw
madness as a condition “in which a person was ‘possessed, controlled, or affected by
some supernatural power or being,’ and this connection has remained ‘extremely
resilient in western culture’” [11].
Any attempt to place mental disability jurisprudence in context results in
confrontation with a discordant reality: social science data that refutes these
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assumptions is rarely a coherent influence on mental disability law doctrine [12-14].
Rather, the legal system selectively—teleologically—accepts or rejects social
science data depending on whether or not the use of that data meets the a priori
needs of the legal system [15, 16]. In other words, social science data is privileged
when it supports the conclusion the fact finder wishes to reach, but it is subordinated
when it questions that conclusion [17].
By way of example, as Susan Stefan has perceptively noted, courts routinely find
mentally disabled women to lack sufficient competence to engage knowingly and
voluntarily in sexual intercourse but just as routinely find them competent to consent
to give their children up for adoption. In one startling case, a court made both of
these findings simultaneously about the same woman [18].
Thus, it is no surprise that courts selectively accept stereotypes to exert social
control—engaging in gross stereotyping about the impact of mental illness on
behavior when sentencing persons convicted of crime or deciding on involuntary
civil commitment and rejecting the stereotypes when acknowledging them might
lead to a socially undesirable result, such as an insanity acquittal [19].
This stereotyping of the effects of mental illness also flows from the meretricious
impact of a false “ordinary common sense” (“OCS”) and the pernicious impact of
heuristic thinking on judicial decision making. OCS is self-referential and nonreflective (“I see it that way, therefore everyone sees it that way; I see it that way,
therefore that’s the way it is”). Not surprisingly, many of the greatest areas of OCScaused dissonance emerge in cases involving family relationships (“If Joe was that
bad...why didn’t the defendant divorce him? Why didn’t she just leave him?”),
sexual assault (“Look at the way she was dressed; she was asking for it”), and mental
illness (“If he had just tried harder, he really could have gotten better”). Areas such
as these are treasure troves of self-righteousness, narrow thinking, and “atrophied
moral development” [20].
Heuristics are “simplifying cognitive devices that frequently lead to...systematically
erroneous decisions through ignoring or misusing rationally useful information” [2123]. The vividness heuristic, for example, is a cognitive simplifying device through
which a “single vivid, memorable case overwhelms mountains of abstract, colorless
data upon which rational choices should be made” [24]. So, because most highprofile cases involving the insanity defense are the focus of exaggerated media
attention, the illusion is created that they are reflective of the entire universe of
insanity cases, or even the entire universe of all cases [25].
The law’s use and misuse of social science and OCS nurture sanism. Decision
making in mental disability law cases is inspired by (and reflects) the same kinds of
irrational, unconscious, bias-driven stereotypes and prejudices that are exhibited in
racist, sexist, homophobic, and religiously and ethnically bigoted decision making.
Sanist decision making infects all branches of mental disability law and distorts
mental disability jurisprudence by, for instance, relying vividly on the heuristic of
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the statistically exceptional but graphically compelling case of the person with a
major mental disorder who is randomly violent [26].
Paradoxically, while sanist decisions are frequently justified as being therapeutically
based, sanism customarily results in antitherapeutic outcomes [27-29]. This happens
in a wide array of decisions, ranging from those that commit insanity acquittees
charged with misdemeanors to maximum-security facilities for many years longer
than the maximum sentence they would have received if found guilty [30] to those
that ignore a Supreme Court decision limiting the indefinite commitment of persons
found permanently incompetent to stand trial [31] to those that mandate medication
over objection even where there is a strong likelihood that neurological side effects
may result [32].
Judges are not immune to sanism. “Embedded in the cultural presuppositions that
engulf us all,” judges also take deeper refuge in heuristic thinking and flawed, nonreflective “ordinary common sense” [33]. They reflect and project the conventional
morality of the community, and judicial decisions in all areas of civil and criminal
mental disability law continue to reflect and perpetuate sanist stereotypes [34]. Thus,
a trial judge responding to a National Center for State Courts’ survey indicated that,
in his mind, defendants who were incompetent to stand trial could have
communicated with and understood their attorneys “if they [had] only wanted” [35].
Judges are not the only sanist actors. Lawyers, legislators, jurors, and witnesses (both
lay and expert) all exhibit sanist traits and characteristics [36].
Sanist attitudes also lead to pretextual decisions. “Pretextuality” refers to the fact that
courts regularly accept (either implicitly or explicitly) testimonial dishonesty,
countenance liberty deprivations in disingenuous ways that bear little or no
relationship to case law or to statutes, and engage in dishonest (and frequently
meretricious) decision making, specifically when witnesses, especially expert
witnesses, show a “high propensity to purposely distort their testimony in order to
achieve desired ends” [37]. The failure of more than half the states to implement the
Supreme Court’s 1972 decision in Jackson v. Indiana [38] (limiting the length of
time one can be kept in a maximum security forensic psychiatric facility solely
because of incompetence to stand trial) is a textbook example of pretextuality [39].
As I have written elsewhere, “the political decision making in insanity acquittal
cases—best exemplified by a National Institute of Mental Health Report conceding
that individual release decisions are made in accordance with political dictates in
‘controversial cases’—demonstrates that pretextuality drives this area of
jurisprudence” [39]. Pretextuality is poisonous; it infects all participants in the
judicial system, breeds cynicism and disrespect for the law, demeans participants,
and reinforces shoddy lawyering, blasé judging, and, at times, perjurious or corrupt
testifying.
Pretextual devices such as condoning perjured testimony, distorting appellate
readings of trial testimony, subordinating statistically significant social science data,
and enacting purportedly prophylactic civil rights laws that have little or no “real-
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world” impact dominate the mental disability law landscape [40]. A few examples
are illustrative. Although the District of Columbia Code contains a provision that
patients can seek either periodic review of their commitment or an independent
psychiatric evaluation, in the first 22 years following the law’s passage not a single
patient exercised this right to statutory review [41]. While former attorney general
William French Smith told Congress that the insanity defense “allows so many
persons to commit crimes of violence,” one of his top aides candidly told a federal
judicial conference that the number of insanity defense cases was, statistically,
“probably insignificant” [42]. When a state enacts a new statutory scheme to “treat”
sex offenders, but fails to hire any professionals experienced in the provision of such
treatment, that new statute is pretextual [43, 44].
In other circumstances, courts simply “rewrite” factual records to avoid having to
deal with social science data that controverts their view of how the world “ought to
be” [45]. The classic example is Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the court in
Parham v. J.R. (1979) [46], approving more relaxed involuntary civil commitment
procedures for juveniles than for adults. Gail Perry and Gary Melton accurately
characterized the Parham case in this way:
The Parham case is an example of the Supreme Court’s taking
advantage of the free rein on social facts to promulgate a dozen or so
of its own by employing one tentacle of the judicial notice doctrine.
The Court’s opinion is filled with social facts of questionable
veracity, accompanied by the authority to propel these facts into
subsequent case law and, therefore, a spiral of less than rational legal
policy making [47].
Even when courts do acknowledge the existence and possible validity of studies that
take a position contrary to their decisions, this acknowledgement is frequently little
more than mere “lip service.” Involuntary civil commitment and periodic review
hearings, for example, rarely make vigorous and authentic inquiries into the
restrictivity of confinement and the availability of community treatment, both of
which they are mandated to do by an array of court decisions [48], and refusal-oftreatment hearings rarely take seriously the autonomy-privileging language of cases
such as Rivers v. Katz [49, 50].
Until system “players” confront the ways that sanist biases inspire the selective
incorporation or misuse of social science data and such pretextual decision making,
mental disability jurisprudence will remain incoherent. Behaviorists, medical
researchers, social scientists, and legal scholars must begin to develop research
agendas to (1) determine and assess the ultimate impact of sanism, (2) better
understand how social science data is manipulated to serve sanist ends, and (3)
formulate normative and instrumental strategies that can be used to rebut sanist
pretextuality in the legal system. Practicing lawyers need to articulate the existence
and dominance of sanism and of pretextual legal behavior in their briefs and oral
arguments so as to sensitize judges to the underlying issues.
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A rare example of judicial understanding of the ravages of sanism and pretextual
thinking is In re the mental health of K.G.F. [51], a decision by the Montana
Supreme Court that focused specifically on sanism as a factor in assessing
effectiveness of counsel in involuntary civil commitment hearings. Underscored the
court:
The use of such stereotypical labels [to describe people with mental
illness, e.g., “idiots” and “lunatics”]—which, as numerous
commentators point out, helps create and reinforce an inferior secondclass of citizens—is emblematic of the benign prejudice individuals
with mental illnesses face, and which are, we conclude, repugnant to
our state constitution. See generally Michael L. Perlin, On “Sanism,”
46 Smu L. Rev. 373, 374 (1992) (identifying prejudice toward the
mentally ill among “well-meaning citizens” as the same “quality and
character of other prevailing prejudices such as racism, sexism,
heterosexism and ethnic bigotry,” which in turn is reflected in our
legal system) [and Bruce Winick’s 1999 article “Therapeutic
Jurisprudence and the Civil Commitment Hearing” in the Journal of
Contemporary Legal Issues] (stating that because people with a
mental illness “already have been marginalized and stigmatized by a
variety of social mechanisms, self-respect and their sense of their
value as members of society are of special importance to them”
throughout legal proceedings) [52].
“Sanism” is well known in the legal community. A recent search of the WESTLAW
database reveals that it has been referred to in 272 law review articles between 1992
and 2013. It is, sadly, much less well-known in the medical community. It is vital
that physicians begin to confront its scope and its significance.
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